This book describes how Shinzo Abe became

This book describes how Shinzo Abe became the longest-serving post-war prime minister after he was inaugurated again after failing to read a book due to too much work these days. This book shows how he became the longest-serving post-war prime minister after overcoming a disastrous failure during his first term in office. Although there are many different logics of his own defense, it is a rare book that illustrates politicians` past political and policy positions and strategies.

It is unfortunate for Prime Minister Abe himself, but he died unexpectedly after a gun attack while on a campaign trail, and a book that reveals his thoughts will come out in the manuscript of a memoir made by interviewing a reporter from the Yomiuri political department just before that.

Korean politicians should refer to the process of maintaining and maintaining a position to win elections by pushing for conservative positions on security and post-war issues, while being highly liberal in terms of financial performance and non-traditional policies. Abe's political insight, strategy and policy stance suggest that Japan's politics are stronger than Korea's.

Below are the relevant quotes.

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1.
If the economy had not been steadily recovering, no matter how hawkish the policy was, it would not have become the longest-serving regime after the war.

After the second Cabinet meeting, the economy continued to expand from December 2012 to just before the COVID-19 crisis. Beyond the booming period of rapid growth (November 1965 to July 1970 for 57 months), the situation is now comparable to the longest period after the war (February 2002 to February 2008 and 73 months).

Of course, I admit that economic growth did not affect the public. Productivity gains and wage increases were slow. Not all Abenomics aimed at a virtuous cycle of the economy has been successful, but it is true that it has achieved some popular support. [Omitted]

We decided to promote the policy that we considered as a historical mission while promoting reviving the economy as the 'first phase of the Abe administration'.

Any cabinet has a high approval rating because it has a "honeymoon effect" at the beginning of the administration. However, if you lean on it and carry out ambiguous policies without a clear national strategy, you will lose support immediately. Therefore, I never tried to stop based on the implementation of economic policies that were demanded by the people.

Memoirs of Shinzo Abe, p.414-415

2.
I also thought it would be nice to implement policies of hawks and doves at the same time. I thought we should reform the way we work while realizing certain secret protection laws or security-related laws, or if we need equal wages for equal labor, we should do it. The business community does not necessarily oppose equal wages and equal labor. [Omitted]

Originally, I was the vice president of social security in the party, so I had a fundamental idea that I wanted to fulfill social security. However, I disagree with the support-oriented thinking that the Constitutional Democratic Party claims. The economy will not improve with just subsidies. However, you should not save the support you need. If the overhaul of security-related laws in 2015 was the peak of hawkish policies, the reform of the entire generation of social security and working methods promoted from 2017 to 2018 was the peak of dovish policies.

Same book, p.292~294

3.
Perhaps she (Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike, who founded the New Conservative Party of Hope in 2017). Abe must have sincerely wanted to take power. If the Liberal Democratic Party had been a dovish prime minister at the time, the conservatives might have turned to the Party of Hope. However, because the opponent was Abe's regime with a conservative signboard, the base of supporters did not collapse. Koike made a mistake in that regard. Those who opposed security-related laws eventually became the Constitutional Democratic Party. Not quitting the governor also affected the Party of Hope. A DPP lawmaker who had different thoughts said, "I will exclude you." If you had said, "I'm very grateful that you guys are here, but I'll make sure you check your security policy," the result might have been completely different. At its peak, it became a high-handed attitude.

Same book p.287

4.
At the time, (註: Liberal Democratic Party) President Sadakazu Tanikaki explained that in order to secure social security, we could not help raising consumption tax. ... The whole reform of social security and taxation system was painted by the Ministry of Finance. Back then, Nakatacho was one of the main colors of the Ministry of Finance. The power of the Ministry of Finance is remarkable.

If the government does not have core policies, the finance ministry will come. The government will depend heavily on them. Prime Minister Naoto Kan's incomprehensible logic was that increasing the consumption system would improve the economy. The Democratic Party of Korea thought it would be cool to introduce "bitter" policies to suit the public's taste at such a time (註: Right after the Great East Japan Earthquake). The "drugs" by bureaucrats worked just as well.

The same book. p.95

5.
It's a kind of luck, too. You have to go get your luck with the idea that you're never going to miss a chance, and you're not going to let go. You step back and you're done in a split second.

Same book. p.391